USS Liberty under air attack by an Israeli Mystere jet. Photographed by Captain McGonagle from the ship’s bridge during the hour-long assault. June 8, 1967, off the Sinai Peninsula. [2201×1443]

During the 1967 Six Day war, Israeli aircraft attacked the USS Liberty off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula. Torpedo boats followed up, and killed twenty-five American sailors when one torpedo detonated in the ship’s midsection. The torpedo boats then machine gunned survivors attempting to flee in lifeboats. 

The attack lasted for more than an hour.

Don’t pay attention to me, I’m just enjoying the calm before the storm and the blocking of comments on this post

Both the Israeli and United States governments conducted inquiries and issued reports that concluded the attack was a mistake due to Israeli confusion about the ship’s identity.
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Gerhard, William D.; Millington, Henry W. (1981). Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty (PDF). NSA History Report, U.S. Cryptologic History series (Report). National Security Agency. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 October 2012. partially declassified 1999, 2003.

My guess is she was supposed to be sunk with all hands so a bogey man could be blamed.

“The central question that has caused the raging debate is whether the Israeli attack was premeditated or deliberately conducted against a ship known by them to be American, or whether it was a tragic accident resulting from negligent mistakes or the fog of war. To this date, no evidence has ever surfaced that the Israelis deliberately attacked what they knew to be an American ship, although numerous books and TV documentaries have attempted to make this case. There is certainly evidence that some Israelis began to doubt that the ship was Egyptian during the course of the air attack, and that failures in command and control contributed to the subsequent torpedo attack. In my view, looking at the evidence available, the initial Navy board of inquiry, led by RADM Isaac Kidd, Jr., was correct in its judgment that the attack was a tragic accident. However, that board was focused on whether actions of Liberty’s crew were in any way responsible for the event, which has led others to question the thoroughness of RADM Kidd’s investigation. However, the investigation has actually stood the test of time.

Nevertheless, beginning almost immediately after the attack and continuing over the years, numerous government and even very senior Navy officials have gone on public record with some version of “in no way could this possibly have been an accident, and no way could the Israeli’s have been that incompetent.” Such opinions, however, have either been based on hearsay, or originated in opinions uttered in the immediate aftermath of the attack, before any investigations were complete. Such expressed opinions by senior government and service officials have lent gravitas to all manner of conspiracy and cover-up theories ranging from the somewhat plausible to the ridiculously outlandish. To this day, various groups with both anti-Israel and pro-Israel agendas continue to challenge the official records in both the U.S. and Israel with alternative hypotheses.”

https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-007.html

” In response to the report of shelling from the sea, the Israeli navy was ordered to dispatch ships to intercept. Two destroyers were promptly recalled, but three motor torpedo boats (MTBs—MTB Division 914) under the command of LCDR Moshe Oren, were ordered to continue. At that time, Liberty was heading westerly in the general direction of Port Said, held by the Egyptians, at a slow speed under 15 knots. As the MTBs made initial radar contact with the ship (at fairly long range—22 nautical miles—due to atmospheric ducting), the combat information center (CIC) officer on the command MTB erroneously calculated Liberty’s speed as 30 knots. By Israeli SOP, an unidentified ship transiting at greater than 20 knots was presumed to be a warship and could be attacked. It also meant that the MTBs would be unable to make the intercept before the contact reached Port Said, which forced Oren to call for air support. Given the testy and competitive relationship at the time between the Israeli navy and air force, it is very unlikely Oren would have called for air support unless he believed there was no alternative. In fact, the Israeli air force and navy had only narrowly averted a potentially catastrophic “friendly fire” engagement the previous night.”

https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-007/h-007-1.html