In early 1916, Germany developed a plan to eliminate France’s reserves by drawing them into a devastating battle of attrition that they could not escape. Having suffered high attrition rates in 1915, notably during the Second and Third Battles of Artois in which the Entente lost twice as many soldiers as Germany for almost no territorial gains, France’s “Cult of the Offensive” mentality offered a weakness the Germans believed they could take advantage of. France had also shown a distaste for heavily entrenching themselves as their offensive doctrine led them to see trenches as only temporary, meanwhile the Germans heavily fortified their trenches to the point that some were closer in living conditions to barracks compared to their Western counterparts. As such, the Germans believed that by targeting Verdun, which was important to France’s military prestige due to the 1870 war and the War of the First Coalition against Prussia, France could be baited into throwing its reserves into a crippling meatgrinder and “bleed itself white” rather than fight strategically at risk of losing Verdun or damaging high command’s ego.
Initially, Germany advanced significantly further than they expected, suffering relatively low losses while badly damaging the French garrison at Verdun. After a French counter-attack failed, Philippe Petain ordered the French to hold their ground and fortify their currently held positions. As a result, German advances slowed and casualties rose significantly in the following weeks. Many positions that the Germans believed could be easily taken proved much more heavily defended than previously thought, and French artillery remained a near constant thorn in commanding officer Falkenhayn’s side throughout the 300-day battle. Falkenhayn even considered halting the offensive early into the battle after suffering over 80,000 casualties. However, the Germans still believed that the French were being hurt much worse than they actually were, claiming that the French were on the brink of collapse and falsely reporting that they inflicted a 5:2 casualty ratio. The truth was in fact much closer to the opposite. Petain had introduced a troop rotation system to withdraw and rest exhausted French units, and the French still had a large amount of reserves able to be committed to the Somme. Meanwhile, most of Germany’s strategic reserve was at Verdun and suffering massive losses which they could not afford to spend in a battle where victory was becoming increasingly unlikely by the week, especially with the simultaneous Brusilov Offensive in the Eastern Front that reclaimed much of previously lost territory, and the Battle of the Somme draining Germany’s western reserves even further. By the end of the battle, both France and Germany suffered around 350,000 casualties each, with French losses being only slightly higher than Germany’s.
TLDR:
Germany planned to inflict massive losses on France by goading them into a slaughterhouse they would not allow themselves to retreat from even with massive losses, but then continued their assaults on Verdun even when continuing the fight was mostly pointless while continuously believing they were on the cusp of winning. Much of what previously allowed Germany to inflict such high losses on France, including extensive fortifications and trying to make soldier’s lives more comfortable to improve morale, was being used against them with Philippe Petain’s decision to fortify Verdun and introduce troop rotation. Germany, having set a trap forever cripple France’s military, had instead fallen hook, line, and sinker for its own bait.
Wasn’t the all “bleed France white” thing partly an excuse made up by Erich von Falkenhayn afterward to justify the failure of his offensive on Verdun ?
Pesec1 on
Technically, this worked: due to higher population to begin with, at Verdun Germany degraded France’s fighting ability to greater extent than it degraded its own.
Unfortunately, as a side effect, it also degraded Germany’s fighting ability against everyone other than France. Which, in turn, allowed France to make up for losses by having its allies assume responsibility for longer stretches of the frontline.
Proof-Ad9085 on
The “bleed France white” goal was found ex-post by Von F. in order to indulge himself.
The plan was always to take Verdun, not create a giant meat grinder.
r6CD4MJBrqHc7P9b on
I find it strange that the generals sat down and the words “bleed France white” were uttered, and nobody just went: “Hey guys… maybe we’re taking this thing just a little too far”
5 Comments
In early 1916, Germany developed a plan to eliminate France’s reserves by drawing them into a devastating battle of attrition that they could not escape. Having suffered high attrition rates in 1915, notably during the Second and Third Battles of Artois in which the Entente lost twice as many soldiers as Germany for almost no territorial gains, France’s “Cult of the Offensive” mentality offered a weakness the Germans believed they could take advantage of. France had also shown a distaste for heavily entrenching themselves as their offensive doctrine led them to see trenches as only temporary, meanwhile the Germans heavily fortified their trenches to the point that some were closer in living conditions to barracks compared to their Western counterparts. As such, the Germans believed that by targeting Verdun, which was important to France’s military prestige due to the 1870 war and the War of the First Coalition against Prussia, France could be baited into throwing its reserves into a crippling meatgrinder and “bleed itself white” rather than fight strategically at risk of losing Verdun or damaging high command’s ego.
Initially, Germany advanced significantly further than they expected, suffering relatively low losses while badly damaging the French garrison at Verdun. After a French counter-attack failed, Philippe Petain ordered the French to hold their ground and fortify their currently held positions. As a result, German advances slowed and casualties rose significantly in the following weeks. Many positions that the Germans believed could be easily taken proved much more heavily defended than previously thought, and French artillery remained a near constant thorn in commanding officer Falkenhayn’s side throughout the 300-day battle. Falkenhayn even considered halting the offensive early into the battle after suffering over 80,000 casualties. However, the Germans still believed that the French were being hurt much worse than they actually were, claiming that the French were on the brink of collapse and falsely reporting that they inflicted a 5:2 casualty ratio. The truth was in fact much closer to the opposite. Petain had introduced a troop rotation system to withdraw and rest exhausted French units, and the French still had a large amount of reserves able to be committed to the Somme. Meanwhile, most of Germany’s strategic reserve was at Verdun and suffering massive losses which they could not afford to spend in a battle where victory was becoming increasingly unlikely by the week, especially with the simultaneous Brusilov Offensive in the Eastern Front that reclaimed much of previously lost territory, and the Battle of the Somme draining Germany’s western reserves even further. By the end of the battle, both France and Germany suffered around 350,000 casualties each, with French losses being only slightly higher than Germany’s.
TLDR:
Germany planned to inflict massive losses on France by goading them into a slaughterhouse they would not allow themselves to retreat from even with massive losses, but then continued their assaults on Verdun even when continuing the fight was mostly pointless while continuously believing they were on the cusp of winning. Much of what previously allowed Germany to inflict such high losses on France, including extensive fortifications and trying to make soldier’s lives more comfortable to improve morale, was being used against them with Philippe Petain’s decision to fortify Verdun and introduce troop rotation. Germany, having set a trap forever cripple France’s military, had instead fallen hook, line, and sinker for its own bait.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Verdun#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Verdun#)
Wasn’t the all “bleed France white” thing partly an excuse made up by Erich von Falkenhayn afterward to justify the failure of his offensive on Verdun ?
Technically, this worked: due to higher population to begin with, at Verdun Germany degraded France’s fighting ability to greater extent than it degraded its own.
Unfortunately, as a side effect, it also degraded Germany’s fighting ability against everyone other than France. Which, in turn, allowed France to make up for losses by having its allies assume responsibility for longer stretches of the frontline.
The “bleed France white” goal was found ex-post by Von F. in order to indulge himself.
The plan was always to take Verdun, not create a giant meat grinder.
I find it strange that the generals sat down and the words “bleed France white” were uttered, and nobody just went: “Hey guys… maybe we’re taking this thing just a little too far”