“During the Pahlavi period the standard of living of all classes improved, owing to economic growth; heavy investment in public utilities and communications networks; expansion of public-health, education, social-security, and medical services; and the removal of many traditional obstacles that had restricted the participation of women in public life, education, and employment (Markaz-e āmār-e Īrān, 1355 Š./1976, pp. 35-72, 157-90, 315-32; idem, 1973, passim)
All villagers, regardless of their position in the social structure, benefited from the economic boom that began in the mid-1340s Š./1960s. The annual expenditure of rural households, at constant prices, increased from about $1,000 in 1344 Š./1965 to about $2,000 in 1354 Š./1975 (*Ketāb-e āgāh*, p. 186). The rising incomes of villagers reflected a modest growth in agricultural productivity combined with an increase in permanent or seasonal construction, factory, or other work in neighboring—and, at times, more distant—urban areas. The improvements in conditions resulting from land reform and economic growth may account for relatively high levels of peasants’ satisfaction with their living conditions reported by several researchers in the late 1350s Š./1970s (see, e.g., Dowlat, Hourcade, and Puech, passim; Mahdawī, pp. 59-64; “Current Political Attitudes,” p. 5) and for their failure to participate in the Revolution (Ashraf, 1991, pp. 288-89).”
Villagers, who constituted about half the population of Persia [Iran] on the eve of the Revolution, remained indifferent to the uprisings in the cities. Of 2,483 demonstrations in support of the Revolution, only 2 percent occurred in rural areas. Some peasants even took part in counterrevolutionary demonstrations, for example, those in which demonstrators opposed to the regime were attacked with clubs and the *bāzār*s, local offices of the Ministry of education, and homes of revolutionary activists were pillaged (for a discussion of the counterrevolutionary role of the peasants, see Ashraf, 1991, pp. 290-91).”
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Thanks to Pahlavi-era reforms, Iranian [life expectancy doubled over 30 years](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1072198/life-expectancy-iran-historical/#:~:text=As%20implementation%20of%20these%20programs,approximately%2039%20years%20in%201950). To quote *Encyclopaedia Iranica*:
“During the Pahlavi period the standard of living of all classes improved, owing to economic growth; heavy investment in public utilities and communications networks; expansion of public-health, education, social-security, and medical services; and the removal of many traditional obstacles that had restricted the participation of women in public life, education, and employment (Markaz-e āmār-e Īrān, 1355 Š./1976, pp. 35-72, 157-90, 315-32; idem, 1973, passim)
All villagers, regardless of their position in the social structure, benefited from the economic boom that began in the mid-1340s Š./1960s. The annual expenditure of rural households, at constant prices, increased from about $1,000 in 1344 Š./1965 to about $2,000 in 1354 Š./1975 (*Ketāb-e āgāh*, p. 186). The rising incomes of villagers reflected a modest growth in agricultural productivity combined with an increase in permanent or seasonal construction, factory, or other work in neighboring—and, at times, more distant—urban areas. The improvements in conditions resulting from land reform and economic growth may account for relatively high levels of peasants’ satisfaction with their living conditions reported by several researchers in the late 1350s Š./1970s (see, e.g., Dowlat, Hourcade, and Puech, passim; Mahdawī, pp. 59-64; “Current Political Attitudes,” p. 5) and for their failure to participate in the Revolution (Ashraf, 1991, pp. 288-89).”
Villagers, who constituted about half the population of Persia [Iran] on the eve of the Revolution, remained indifferent to the uprisings in the cities. Of 2,483 demonstrations in support of the Revolution, only 2 percent occurred in rural areas. Some peasants even took part in counterrevolutionary demonstrations, for example, those in which demonstrators opposed to the regime were attacked with clubs and the *bāzār*s, local offices of the Ministry of education, and homes of revolutionary activists were pillaged (for a discussion of the counterrevolutionary role of the peasants, see Ashraf, 1991, pp. 290-91).”